Abstract--This paper shows how several security classes in Liaw-Wang-Lei's cryptographic key assignment scheme can collaborate to derive the secret key of their immediate ancestor in some cases. We also propose two schemes which are a slight modification of the proposed scheme to enhance the level of security.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Liaw, Wang and Lei [1] proposed an efficient cryptographic key assignment scheme for solving the access control problem in a tree structure. Basically, the scheme is based on Newton's interpolating method and a one-way function. The scheme not only achieves dynamic key assignment, but is also simple and efficient for generating and derivating keys. However, we show that several security classes can collaborate to derive the secret key of their immediate ancestor in this article. We also propose two schemes for modifying Liaw-Wang-Lei's scheme slightly so that the security will be greatly improved.
for j = 1, 2,..., d, where F denotes a pseudo-one-way function, F(X) = X 2 + 1 mod P. The pairs of public parameters (tli,, t2ij), P, and F are known to all security classes in the scheme. The security class Ci keeps only its own key K~ secret.
To 
where (a0,x0) = (0, Ki), (aj,xj) = (tlij,t2i~), 1 < j _< d, and el, e2 are constants. Next, we take the polynomial NPi(t2~j ) in equation (1) Let the prime number P = 13 and the one-way function FiX ) = X 2 + 1 mod 13. Under the proposed scheme, the secret key Ki and public parameters (tli#, t2~#) for each security class Ci# are as shown in Table 1 . The following steps will show how C4 and Cs can collaborate to derive the secret key of C1.
Construct an interpolating polynomial of C1 with one unknown variable KSo we have
NPl(x) = 2(x -8)(x -gl) + (x -gl) mod 13.
2. Substitute the public parameters (t21a and t215) of C4 and C5 into equation (2), respectively:
NPl(t21s) = NPl(3) = 12 + 9K1 mod 13. 
Substitute NPl(t214) and NP1(t215) into the one-way function (F(X)
4. By the Gaussian elimination method, we obtain K1 = 2 from equation (4) and equation (5).
In fact, either C4 or C5 can derive the secret key of C1 because the one-way function is Quadratic Residuosity modulo [3] .
Co C8 Figure 1 . An example of the tree structure. 
OUR SCHEMES
We have shown that Liaw-Wang-Lei's scheme is insecure. Since the purpose of Newton's interpolate polynomial is only hiding secret keys in their scheme, the powerful and high secure one-waY function is needed.
From the above discussion and example, we see that d-1 security classes can collaborate to attack the one-way function of degree d. We now give two extended schemes which improve Liaw-Wang-Lei's scheme for withstanding this type of attack. SCHEME 1. Take different prime number P within Galois field GF(P) to Newton's interpolating polynomial and the predefined one-way function. For example, Let P1 and P2 be two large but not equal prime numbers. We can construct NP(x) = (otd(x --Xd-1)(X --Xd-2)''' (X --XO) + • " + C~I (X --X0) + C~0) rood P1 as Newton's interpolating polynomial for each security class in the system. And take F(X) = X 2 + 1 mod P2 as our predefined one-way function. SCHEME 2. Choose a one-way function of degree d + 2, where d is the maximal number of immediate successors of each security class in the whole system. The above extended schemes not only retain the advantages of the scheme in [1] but also enhance the security.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how several security classes in Liaw-Wang-Lei's cryptographic key assignment scheme can collaborate to derive the secret key of their immediate ancestor in some cases. We also have proposed two extended schemes which are a slight modification of the proposed scheme. The proposed schemes not only retain the advantages of Liaw-Wang-Lei's scheme but also enhance the security.
